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Bankruptcy Law-SECURED TRANSACTIONS-BANKRUPTCY 
TRUSTEE'S POWER TO AVOID AS PREFERENTIAL A CREDITOR'S PER- 
F E ~ E D  SECURITY INTEREST UNDER U .C .C . SECTION 9-306(4) (d) IN 
EXCESS P R O C E E D S - A ~ ~ O ~ ~  Wholesale Supply Co. v. I tuk (In re 
Gibson Products), 543 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1976). 
Prior to 1972, petitioner, Arizona Wholesale Supply Com- 
pany (Wholesale), sold various brand name appliances to Gibson 
Products of Arizona (Gibson) under a secured financing arrange- 
ment whereby Wholesale retained a perfected security interest in 
the appliances.' On January 13,1972, Gibson, indebted to Whole- 
sale for the subjectjnventory in the amount of $28,800, initiated 
Chapter XI proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act? During the 
ten-day period immediately preceding the filing of the bank- 
ruptcy petition, Gibson deposited $19,505.27 in its bank account. 
Included in the deposited amount were $10 from the sale by Gib- 
son of one of Wholesale's appliances. 
Wholesale sought and obtained an order from the bank- 
ruptcy judge awarding it the entire $19,505.27 amount, based 
upon Uniform Commercial Code (U.C .C .) section 9-306(4) .3 The 
1. The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), prior to amendments in 1972, required 
that for the perfection of a security interest in inventory (defined at U.C.C. § 9-109(4)), 
(1) an agreement for the security must be made, (2) the secured creditor must give value, 
(3) the debtor must have rights in the collateral, and (4) a financing statement must be 
filed. U.C.C. §§ 9-204, -302(1) (1962 version). For variations, not applied in this case, of 
the above requirements, see Henson, "Roceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 
65 COLUM. L. REV. 232, 235 nn.11-13 (1965). 
2. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1970). 
Chapter XI [of the Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-99 (1970),] . . . provides for the 
proposal of an arrangement for the settlement, satisfaction, or extension of time 
of payment of unsecured debts. The petition under that chapter does not seek 
an adjudication, although such may ultimately be entered, and a liquidation 
and distribution of the debtor's property is not [normally] contemplated dur- 
ing the administration of a case under Chapter XI. 
8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 7 1.02, at 5-6 (14th ed. J. Moore & J. King 1976). 
3. Discussion herein will be limited (as was that of the Ninth Circuit) to U.C.C. § 9- 
306 (1962 version), rather than to the Arizona statute adopting this section of the U.C.C. 
(ARIZ. bv. STAT. § 44-3127 (1967). In addition, use will be made of the text of U.C.C. § 
9-306 prior to the 1972 amendments thereof, since Arizona did not adopt the 1972 amend- 
ments until 1975 (effective January 1,1976), a date long after this litigation was instituted. 
The Ninth Circuit correctly observed that even if applicable, the 1972 amendments did 
not affect the issues of the case. 
In pertinent part, U.C.C. § 9-306 (1962 version) provides: 
(1) "Proceeds" includes whatever is received when collateral or proceeds 
is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed of. The term also includes 
the account arising when the right to payment is earned under a contract right. 
Money, checks and the like are "cash proceeds". All other proceeds are "non- 
cash proceeds". 
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receiver in bankruptcy4 appealed to the federal district court, 
which affirmed the order.5 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
agreed to referee what it recognized as the long anticipated and 
much debated6 potential conflict between the "proceeds" provi- 
(2) Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest con- 
tinues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof 
by the debtor unless his action was authorized by the secured party in the 
security agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any identifiable proceeds 
including collections received by the debtor. 
(3) The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected security 
interest if the interest in the original collateral was perfected but it ceases to be 
a perfected security interest and becomes unperfected ten days after receipt of 
the proceeds by the debtor unless 
(a) a filed financing statement covering the original collateral 
also covers proceeds; or 
(b) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected before the 
expiration of the ten day period. 
(4) In the event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a 
debtor, a secured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds has a 
perfected security interest 
in identifiable non-cash proceeds; 
in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of money which is 
not commingled with other money or deposited in a bank 
account prior to the insolvency proceedings; 
in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of checks and the like 
which are not deposited in a bank account prior to the insol- 
vency proceedings; and 
in all cash and bank accounts of the debtor if other cash 
proceeds have been commingled or deposited in a bank ac- 
count, but the perfected security interest under this para- 
graph (d) is 
(i) subject to any right of set-off; and 
(ii) limited to an amount not greater than the amount of 
any cash proceeds received by the debtor within ten 
days before the institution of the insolvency proceed- 
ings and commingled or deposited in a bank account 
prior to the insolvency proceedings less the amount 
of cash proceeds received by the debtor and paid over 
to the secured party during the ten day period. 
4. It is immaterial to the issues of this case that the official appointee in bankruptcy 
is a receiver, rather than a trustee. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY fl 6.15 (14th ed. J. Moore & 
J. King 1976). Professor MacLachlan has indicated that "[oln principle it is clear enough 
that all transfers avoidable by a trustee in bankruptcy should be avoidable in Chapter 
XI proceedings, whether the estate is administered by a trustee, a receiver, or a debtor in 
possession." J. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 8 342 (1956). To 
conform with the terminology of other provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, the text will 
hereinafter refer to the receiver in the instant case as a "trustee." 
5. Arizona Wholesale Supply Co. v. Itule (In re Gibson Products), No. 1388 (D. Ariz. 
Oct. 24, 1975). 
6. See, e.g., 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY Q 70.62A [4.3] (14th ed. J. Moore & J. King 
1976); 2 G. GILMORE, SECURED INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY fl 45.9 (1965); Countryman, 
Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 COM. L.J. 269, 275 (1970); Duesenberg, Lien or 
940 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
sion of the Uniform Commercial Code (section 9-306) and the 
bankruptcy trustee's power to avoid preferences under section 60 
of the Bankruptcy Act.' In reversing the district court's decision, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the operation of U.C.C. section 9- 
306(4)(d) created a voidable preference under section 60 of the 
Bankruptcy Act by transferring to the creditor a perfected secu- 
rity interest in the cash deposited in the debtor's accountR that 
exceeded the amount of proceeds therein obtained from the credi- 
tor's collateral. 
A. Development of the Proceeds Provision of the Code 
1. Uniform Trust Receipts Actg 
The progenitor of U.C.C. section 9-306(4) was section 10(b) 
of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act (U.T.R.A.).1° In effect, that 
provision directed that a secured creditor was entitled to "prior- 
ity" over unsecured creditors in payment from the debtor's assets 
in an amount equal to all proceeds (whether or not identifiable) 
Priority Under Section 10, Uniform Trust Receipts Act, 2 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 73, 
78, 83-84 (1960); Epstein, "Proceeding" Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 787, 803-08 (1969); Gillombardo, T h e  Treatment of Uniform Commercial Code 
Proceeds i n  Bankruptcy: A Proposed Redraft of  Section 9-306, 38 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 28-29 
(1969); Hawkland, The  Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the UCC, Part 11: Proceeds, 
77 COM. L.J. 12,18-19 (1972); Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 
65 COLUM. L. REV. 232, 248-54 (1965); Kennedy, The  Impact of the Uniform Commercial 
Code on  Insolvency: Article 9, 67 COM. L.J. 113, 118 (1962); Levy, Effect of the Uniform 
Commercial Code Upon Bankruptcy Law and Procedure, 60 COM. L.J. 9, 12 (1955); 
Marsh, Triumph or Tragedy? T h e  Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1966, 42 WASH. L. REV. 
681, 716-17 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Marsh, Triumph]; Schwartz, The Effect of the  
Uniform Commercial Code on Secured Financing Transactions and Bankruptcy, 38 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REV. 50, 60-68 (1963); Comment, The Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy 
Act; Potential Conflicts, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 411, 412-18 (1958); Comment, Toward Com- 
mercial Reasonableness: A n  Examination of  Some of  the  Conflicts Between Article 9 of 
the  Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939,941-52 
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Commercial Reasonableness]; Marsh, Book Review, 13 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 898, 908-09 (1966). 
7. 11 U.S.C. 8 96 (1970). 
8. U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)(iii) limits the perfected security interest in the cash and bank 
accounts of the debtor where commingling has occurred to the "cash proceeds received 
[and commingled] . . . within ten days before the institution of the insolvency proceed- 
ings . . . ." 
9. Although the Uniform Trust Receipts Act (U.T.R.A.) was drafted in the 1920's, 
see 2 G .  GWORE, SECURED INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY fl 27.2 (1965), it was not 
officially promulgated until 1933. See General Comment of  National Conference of Com- 
missioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE: 1972 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS ix-x (1972). The U.T.R.A., as a model act, was 
specifically repealed by U.C.C. § 10-102 (1962 version) and replaced by the U.C.C. 
10. 2 G. GILMORE, supm note 6, a t  1340-41. 
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collected by the debtor within ten days prior to either the initia- 
tion of insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings or a demand on the 
debtor for prompt accounting.ll The use of the word "priority" in 
section 10(b) triggered an amendment in 1938 to the Bankruptcy 
Act whereby state-created priorities were to be held invalid in 
federal bankruptcy proceedings.12 State-created statutory liens, 
however, remained valid in bankruptcy.13 Therefore, the issue of 
whether an interest created by U.T.R.A. section 10(b) would en- 
dure in bankruptcy turned on whether the section created, in 
fact, a priority or a lien. 
Only two major cases involving the survival of the U.T.R.A. 
section 10(b) "priority" interest in bankruptcy were ever liti- 
gated." In the first case, In re Harpeth Motors, Inc., l5 a federal 
11. U.T.R.A. § 10(b) stated: 
Where, under the terms of the trust receipt transaction, the trustee has no 
liberty of sale or other disposition, or having liberty of sale or other disposition, 
is to account to the entruster for the proceeds of any disposition of the goods, 
documents or instruments, the entruster shall be entitled, to the extent to which 
and as against all classes of persons as to whom his security interest was valid 
at the time of disposition by the trustee, as follows: 
. . . .  
to any proceeds or the value of any proceeds (whether such 
proceeds are identifiable or not) of the goods, documents or 
instruments, if said proceeds were received by the trustee 
within ten days prior to either application for appointment of 
a receiver of the trustee, or the filing of a petition in bank- 
ruptcy or judicial insolvency proceedings by or against the 
trustee, or demand made by the entruster for prompt ac- 
counting; and to a priority to the amount of such proceeds or 
value . . . . 
(Quoted in Henson, supra note 6, at 243-44.) 
12. Bankruptcy Act § 64, 52 Stat. 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. 8 104 (1970). 
The Bankruptcy Act does not expressly eliminate state priorities; however, such is a 
necessary result since the five-tiered scheme of distribution as set forth in § 64 of the Act 
is exclusive. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 6, at 797 n.39, citing Halpert v. Indus. Comm'r, 
147 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1945). (Section 64d of the Act does, however, allow certain state- 
created priorities in favor of landlords' rent claims to survive in bankruptcy.) 
13. J. MACLACHIAN, HANDBOOK F THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 4 212 (1956). In 1966, 5 
67c(l)(A) was added to the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(l)(A) (1970). The section 
invalidates 
every statutory lien which first becomes effective upon the insolvency of the 
debtor, or upon distribution or liquidation of his property, or upon execution 
against his property levied at the instance of one other than the lienor. 
(emphasis added) See generally Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Amendments of 1966, 1 GA. 
L. REV. 149 (1967). 
14. Other cases have specifically avoided the issue of priority versus lien, e.g., English 
v. Universal CIT Credit Corp., 278 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1960). See also Henson, supra note 
6, at 244-45. 
15. 135 F. Supp. 863 (M.D. Tenn. 1955). In this case the creditor held a series of trust 
receipts, each covering a separate automobile. Before the institution of bankruptcy pro- 
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district court concluded that despite the actual use of the word 
"priority" in section 10(b), the intent of the U.T.R.A. was to 
create a lien. The court found, therefore, that a lien was created 
and that it was valid against the trustee in bankruptcy? Four 
years later, in Commercial Credit Corp. u. Allen (In re Crosstown 
Motors, Inc. )," the Seventh Circuit, basing its opinion principally 
on legislative history and use of the word "priority,"lR took a 
contrary view and ruled that U.T.R.A. section 10(b) was ineffec- 
tive in bankruptcy, in that the interest section 10(b) attempted 
to produce was a state-created priority and, as such, was invalid 
under section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act.Ig 
2. Adoption of and changes in the U. C. C. 
Thereafter, the U.C.C. was revised in an apparent attempt 
to avoid the attacks leveled on U.T.R.A. section 10(b) that had 
resulted in a decisive split in judicial authority. To accomplish 
this as well as carry out, if possible, the manifest intent of 
U.T.R.A. section 10(b), U.C.C. section 9-306(4) was adopted, 
which, among other changes,20 substituted the phrase "security 
interest" for "priority." Moreover, subsection (d) of U.C .C. sec- 
tion 9-306(4) gave a secured creditor, subject to any right of setoff, 
a perfected security interest in the entire cash amount received 
and commingled with proceeds from the secured property within 
ten days of insolvency  proceeding^.^' The purpose behind this 
ceedings, the trustee-dealer commingled the proceeds from the sale of the automobiles 
with other assets. The creditor filed a petition to the bankruptcy court asserting a lien 
upon the amount of the proceeds from the sale. Id. a t  864-65. 
16. Commentators generally have agreed with the court's reasoning. Hanna, The 
Secured Creditor in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 471, 488-89 (1960); Note, 34 CHI.- 
KENT L. REV. 294 (1955); Note, 69 HAW. L. REV. 1343-45 (1956); Note, 66 YALE L.J. 922- 
23 (1957). Contra, Comment, Bankruptcy-Uniform Trust Receipts Act Section 
IO(b)-Security Interest in the General Assets of the Trustee not Created, 35 N.Y.U.L. 
REV. 948-49 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy]. 
17. 272 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 811 (1960). Here, the creditor 
entered into a financing agreement under which automobiles were sold to the bankrupt 
auto dealer. When the creditor discovered that the dealer had sold a number of cars out 
of trust and its subsequent demands for payment were unproductive, it filed a petition 
for a prior lien on the general assets of the bankrupt based on the Illinois statute adopting 
U.T.R.A. § 10(b). 
18. Id. a t  226. 
19. Commentators have generally rejected the Seventh Circuit's reasoning. See, e.g., 
2 G. GILMORE, supra note 6, at 1342-43; Henson, supra note 6, a t  244-46. Contra, 
Bankruptcy, note 16 supra; Note, 58 MICH. L. REV. 783-86 (1960). 
20. See 2 G.  GILMORE, supra note 6, at 1341-42. 
21. For complete text of U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d), see note 3 supra. Whereas the 1962 
version of subsection (d) allows a creditor access to "all cash and bank accounts of the 
debtor" if the creditor's proceeds have been commingled in any of the accounts, the 1972 
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provision was to eliminate the expense and burden on secured 
creditors of tracing proceeds when funds became commingled 
and, in return, to limit the reach of such creditors to the amount 
received within the prescribed ten-day period.22 
Prior to the instant case, the validity in bankruptcy of the 
perfected security interest conferred under U.C.C. section 9- 
306(4)(d) had never squarely been ad judi~a ted .~~ In 1974, in 
Fitzpatrick v. Philco Finance C~rp . ,~ '  a trustee in bankruptcy 
sought to recover from a secured creditor, Philco, payments made 
by the bankrupt to Philco during the ten-day period prior to the 
filing of the debtor's bankruptcy petition. The payments, in 
amount, were in excess of proceeds traceable to Philco's collateral 
received by the debtor during the same period. The Seventh Cir- 
cuit avoided the impending confrontation between U.C.C. section 
9-306(4)(d) and section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act by ruling solely 
within its interpretation of the provisions of the U.C.C. The court 
concluded that the phrase "any cash proceeds" employed in sec- 
tion 9-306(4)(d)(ii) did not refer to all receipts from any source 
commingled or deposited in the bank account, but rather referred 
to "cash proceeds," as defined in section 9-306(1). Therefore, the 
phrase meant "cash proceeds from the sale of collateral in which 
the creditor had a security interest;"25 hence, Philco had no right 
to the excess proceeds. Accordingly, the overage payment was 
voidable as a preference and was to be surrendered to the trustee 
in bankruptcy. 
B. Preference Provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 
Under common law, in general, a debtor may by payment or 
other transfer lawfully prefer any one or more of its creditors over 
other creditors, so long as the object of the transaction is to pay 
or secure payment of a debt.26 When such a transfer is related to 
version limits access to "all cash and deposit accounts of the debtor in which proceeds 
have been commingled with other funds . . . ." (emphasis added) 
22. See, e.g., 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 6, a t  1340-41; In re Gibson, 6 UCC REP. SERV. 
1193 (W.D. Okla. 1969). 
23. See, e.g., 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 6, a t  1344 n.9 (no cases before 1965); Epstein, 
supra note 6, a t  807 (no cases before 1966); Fitzpatrick v. Philco Fin. Corp., 491 F.2d 1288 
(7th Cir. 1974) (discussed in text accompanying notes 24 and 25 infra) (court's opinion 
implies no cases on point before 1974). 
A number of cases have avoided the issue by the parties' reserving the right to proceed 
a t  a future time as to whether U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d) was in conflict with the Bankruptcy 
Act. See, e.g., In re Security Aluminum Co., 9 UCC REP. SERV. 47 (E.D. Mich. 1971). 
24. 491 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1974). 
25. Id. at  1291-92. 
26. Johnson-Baillie Shoe Co. v. Bardsley, 237 F. 763 (8th Cir. 1916). 
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a subsequent bankruptcy, however, it likely will violate prohibi- 
tory sections of the Bankruptcy Act.27 
Under subsections a and b of section 60 of the Bankruptcy 
Act certain "transfers" are deemed to be preferential and the 
trustee in bankruptcy is authorized to avoid the same.2R Eight 
elements must coexist before a secured transaction may be set 
aside as a preference. The transaction must be (1) a transfer (2) 
of the debtor's property (3) to or for the benefit of a creditor (4) 
made by the debtor while insolvent (5) within four months of 
bankruptcy (6) on account of an antecedent debt (7) with the 
effect of enabling the creditor to obtain a greater percentage of 
its debt than some other creditor of the same class. In addition, 
it must be shown that (8) the creditor had reasonable cause to 
believe that the debtor was insolvent when the transfer was 
made.29 
Since the adoption of the Bankruptcy Act in 1898, this provi- 
sion has continually given significant protection to the interests 
of unsecured creditors (represented by the trustee) from the de- 
pletion effect such unchecked transfers would have on the bank- 
rupt's estate.30 
In considering the instant case, the Ninth Circuit rejected 
the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in its Fitzpatrick decision as im- 
permissibly bending the language and structure of section 9- 
306(4). The court determined to leave that section undisturbed 
as drafted and to apply directly, for the first time, section 60 of 
the Bankruptcy Act to resolve the apparent conflict. 
- -- 
27. Id. For provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, in addition to § 60 of the Act, that may 
render transfers made prior to bankruptcy invalid or voidable, see text accompanying 
notes 46 and 47 infra. 
28. 11 U.S.C. 8 96(a), (b) (1970). 
29. Id. See also Henson, supra note 6, a t  248. For a discussion of the requirement that 
the creditor have had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent a t  the time 
of the transfer, see notes 36 and 37 and accompanying text infra. 
30. Professor MacLachlan has stated: 
The law of preferences is the most significant contribution of bankruptcy to 
commercial law, not merely because it  promotes equitable distribution in bank- 
ruptcy, but also because it  weakens incentives to profit from a race of diligence 
and promotes sound credit practices. 
J. MACLACHLAN, SUPM note 4, § 247, a t  283. The original text of Bankruptcy Act § 60, 30 
Stat. 562 (1898), has been amended six times: 32 Stat. 799 (1903), 36 Stat. 842 (1910), 44 
Stat. 666 (1926), 52 Stat. 869 (1938), 64 Stat. 24 (1950) and 77 Stat. 14 (1963). 
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Referring to section 60a of the Act, the court asserted that if 
"a transfer . . . within four months before the filing [of bank- 
r~ptcy]"~'  had occurred, all the requirements thereunder would 
be met to allow the trustee to avoid as a preference the interest 
in excess proceeds created by U.C .C. section 9-306(4) (d) . Noting 
its own language in a previous opinion, the court observed that a 
" '[tlransfer' . . . is . . . equated with the act by which priority 
over later creditors is achieved and not with the event which 
attaches the security interest to a specific account."32 The court 
concluded that the act that gave Wholesale priority over other 
creditors in the excess proceeds was the institution of insolvency 
proceedings and not the filing of the financing statement, which 
covered only the creditor's collateral and the proceeds received 
therefrom. Thus, there was a transfer within the meaning of the 
Bankruptcy Act, and even though Wholesale had a perfected se- 
curity interest under section 9-306(4)(d) in the entire bank ac- 
count, the trustee could avoid as a preference all amounts in 
excess of Wholesale's cash proceeds included in the account. 
A. Effect of Gibson 
In Gibson, a secured creditor's right under U.C.C. section 9- 
306(4)(d) to a perfected security interest in a debtor's entire com- 
mingled bank account33 met its first clear judicial test in bank- 
ruptcy-and it failed.34 What the Ninth Circuit gave in upholding 
the section 9-306(4) perfected security interest as prima facie 
valid, it felt constrained to take away by acknowledging an excep- 
tion under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. In effect, the court 
merely conceded to the creditor the same rights it had in pre- 
U.C.C. and pre-U.T.R.A. periods-the right in bankruptcy to 
31. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(l), 11 U.S.C. 96(a)(l) (1970). 
32. DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277, 1287 (9th Cir. 1969). The court also observed 
the applicability of Bankruptcy Act § 60a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1970)' which provides 
in pertinent part: 
For the purposes of . . . [§§ 60a & b], a transfer of property . . . shall be 
deemed to have been made or suffered at the time when it became so far per- 
fected that no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by legal or equita- 
ble proceedings on a simple contract could become superior to the rights of the 
transferee. 
33. The debtor's claim on the entire account is subject to the limitations imposed by 
subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d). 
34. "It is often said that the acid test of a security interest is in the debtor's bank- 
ruptcy." R. Henson, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 156 
(1973). 
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claim its own identifiable proceeds, commingled or otherwise." 
Thus, if the trustee in bankruptcy asserts that the creditor 
had reasonable cause to know of the debtor's insolvency at the 
time of the tran~fer,~' and is able to prove that a~sertion,~' the 
instant case effectively renders impotent the perfected security 
interest in excess proceeds created and sustained by U.T.R.A. 
section 10(b) and U.C.C. section 9-306(4)(d) for over forty-three 
years.38 
B. Examination of the Court's Reasoning 
1.  Application of section 60 to resolve the conflict 
The crucial factor in considering the applicability of section 
60 in resolving the statutory conflict is the determination of the 
time of transfer: only transfers made within four months of bank- 
ruptcy are voidable under section 60 of the Act by the trustee in 
bankr~p tcy .~~  Several notable scholars have advanced the argu- 
ment that there is no transfer for purposes of section 60 at the 
time of the institution of insolvency proceedings." Moreover, 
35. See, e.g., Gillombardo, supra note 6, at 30-31. Comment 2(a) to U.C.C. § 9-306 
(1962 version) states in pertinent part: 
Whether a debtor's sale of collateral was authorized or unauthorized, prior law 
generally gave the secured party a claim to the proceeds. . . . Whatever the 
formulation of the rule, the secured party, if he could trace the proceeds, could 
reclaim them . . . from the debtor or his trustee in bankruptcy. 
36. This requirement is imposed by § 60b of the Bankruptcy Act. See text accompa- 
nying note 29 supm. Whether the creditor had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor 
was insolvent at the time of the transfer is a question of fact. If substantial evidence is 
produced indicating facts and circumstances at the time of transfer that would cause an 
ordinarily prudent businessman in the creditor's position to conclude that insolvency 
existed, it is strictly a question for the jury and not for the court. Actual knowledge by 
the creditor is not required; it  is sufficient to show circumstances that would have put a 
person of ordinary prudence and discretion on notice. 1 BANKR. L REP. (CCH) fi 5562.01 
(numerous cases cited). 
37. Usually when the trustee in bankruptcy seeks to avoid transfers as preferential 
under § 60b of the Act, the trustee is in the position of plaintiff-thus clearly having the 
burden of proof. See generally 1 BANKR. L. EtEP. (CCH) fi 5562.04. The circumstances 
surrounding the interest in excess proceeds under U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d), however, often 
force a reversal in the identity of the parties. Many times, as in the instant case, it is the 
creditor who is seeking to obtain its § 9-306(4) interest from the trustee who is in "posses- 
sion" of the debtor's bank account. Nevertheless, it seems logical that the burden of proof 
with regard to § 6Ob of the Act be required to remain with the defendant trustee. 
38. See note 9 supra. 
39. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(l), b, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(l), (b) (1970). 
40. See, e.g., 2 G. GILMORE, note 6 supra; Henson, supra note 6, at 248-52. It should 
be noted that Professor Gilmore was-one of the two principal draftsmen of the original 
version (1952) of Article 9 of the U.C.C. as well as a participant in subsequent revisions. 
Marsh, Book Review, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 898, 899 (1966). 
9381 CASE NOTES 947 
there is no transfer after the original secured transaction has been 
perfected. This argument is based on the concept that the original 
collateral, identifiable proceeds therefrom, and section 9- 
306(4)(d) unidentifiable proceeds continue through time as a 
unit, or "entity." The "transfer" of this entity, they assert, occurs 
when the perfected security interest attaches to the original com- 
ponents (collateral) of the entity." Therefore, the time of transfer 
of a perfected security interest in excess proceeds under U.C.C. 
section 9-306(4)(d) is the same as, and relates back to, the time 
when perfection of a security interest in the original collateral was 
achieved." Because under this theory the "transfer" would occur 
a t  a much earlier date, a substantially greater percentage of sec- 
tion 9-306(4)(d) security interests would survive bankruptcy, 
since they would fall outside the four-month limitation. 
The entity concept fails to appreciate the fact that a secured 
creditor's perfected interest under U.C .C. section 9-306(4) (d) in 
proceeds other than those from the sale of the creditor's secured 
property arises only upon the institution of insolvency proceed- 
ings. Prior to that moment, there is no security interest in either 
the "excess" proceeds or any property from which "excess" pro- 
ceeds may be derived." Furthermore, the theories of "automatic 
perfection" and "substituted ~ol la teral"~~ lend no support to the 
41. This "unit" or "entity" concept has most often been advanced in the related but 
distinct area of the conflict between § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act and the "after-acquired" 
provision of the Code (U.C.C. § 9-204). See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 6, at 804-06; Henson, 
supra note 6, at 248-52; Kennedy, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on 
Isoluency: Article 9, 67 COM. L.J. 113,118-19 (1962). See also Commercial Reasonableness, 
supra note 6, at 942-48. For a discussion of the relationship of the after-acquired Code 
provisions to § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, see Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference 
Challenge to After-Acquired Property Clauses Under the Code, 108 U .  PA. L. REV. 194 
(1959). 
42. Henson, supra note 6, at 248-52. 
43. With regard to "excess" proceeds, the position of a creditor prior to insolvency 
proceedings (and hence, prior to any claim under U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)) is that of a general, 
unsecured creditor. Thereafter, upon perfection of a security interest in "excess" proceeds 
under § 9-306(4)(d), the seventh requirement of Bankruptcy Act §§  60a, b, see text 
accompanying note 29 supra, is satisfied in that the transfer has the effect of enabling the 
creditor to obtain a greater percentage of its debt than some other creditors of the same 
class. For a discussion of "class," see Comment, "Class"-the Forgotten Element of 
Section 60(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 ARIZ. L. REV. 360 (1969). 
44. The theory of "automatic perfection" advances the argument that a security 
interest in future (after-acquired) property is perfected from the inception of the security 
agreement, see note 1 supra, without any further act or agreement on the part of the 
debtor. Thus, a security interest automatically is perfected in and attaches to any prop- 
erty within the contemplation of the agreement from the time the debtor acquires rights 
in such property. For a discussion of this concept, see Commercial Reasonableness, supra 
note 6, at 944-46. See also Friedman, supra note 41, at 207-14. 
The "substituted collateral" theory is based on the concept that a creditor, upon 
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concept of having the time of transfer of the security interest in 
excess proceeds relate back to the time of perfecting the original 
collateral. In other words, since a section 9-306(4)(d) secured 
creditor has no right to the excess proceeds until the institution 
of insolvency proceedings, no "transfer" can possibly occur before 
that time. The Ninth Circuit recognized this fundamental dis- 
tinction and, as a result, correctly applied the bankruptcy stat- 
ute? 
Other commentators have suggested that even though sec- 
tion 9-306(4)(d) might escape the strictures of the preference pro- 
visions in bankruptcy, it would still be fatally vulnerable to a t  
least one of several other sections of the Bankruptcy Act? On the 
other hand, there also exists substantial authority supportive of 
the proposition that section 9-306(4)(d) cannot be held to submit 
to any of the Bankruptcy Act  provision^.^^ In any event, it is 
obtaining a perfected security interest in specified collateral, acquires a perfected security 
interest in any collateral ("proceeds" or otherwise) derived from the sale or exchange of 
the original collateral. Moreover, the time of perfection of the "substituted" collateral 
relates back to the time of perfecting the security interest in the original collateral. For a 
discussion of this concept, see Epstein, supra note 6, at 804-07; Henson, supra note 6, a t  
236-39; Kennedy, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on Insolvency: Article 9, 
67 COM. L.J. 113, 120 (1962); Commercial Reasonableness, supra note 6, at 947-48. 
45. Several notable commentators have sustained reasoning similar to that employed 
by the court. See, e.g., 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 8 70.62A [4.3], a t  710 (14th ed. J. 
Moore & J. King 1976); Countryman, supra note 6, a t  275; Duesenberg, supra note 6, a t  
78-79; Epstein, supra note 6, at 804-06. See also Commercial Reasonableness, supra note 
6, a t  944-48. 
46. For authority indicating an invalid state-created priority under Bankruptcy Act 
4 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970), see Coogan & Vagts, The Secured Creditor and the Bank- 
ruptcy Act: An Introduction, in 1 P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN & D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANSAC- 
TIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9.03[3][b][iii] (1968); Gillombardo, 
supra note 6, a t  28-29; Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commer- 
cial Code: Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 518, 532-34 
(1960). See also Elliott v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 
U S .  829 (1966); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Allen (In re Crosstown Motors, Inc.), 272 
F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 811 (1960). 
For authority indicating an invalid statutory lien under § 67c of the Act, 11 U.S.C. Ej 
107(c) (1970), see Countryman, supra note 6, a t  274; Gillombardo, supra note 6, a t  29; 
Kennedy, supra a t  532-33; Marsh, Triumph, supm note 6, a t  715-16; Viles, Uniform 
Commercial Code v. The Bankruptcy Act, 55 KY. L.J. 636, 678 n.143 (1967). 
For authority indicating invalidity under § 70c of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970), 
see 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUFTCY § 70.62A [4.3], a t  710 (14th ed. J. Moore & J. King 1976); 
Kennedy, supra at 532-33; Marsh, Triumph, supra note 6, a t  716; Commercial Reason- 
ableness, supra note 6, a t  954-55. 
For authority suggesting susceptibility to § 70e of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1970), 
see Gillombardo, supra note 6, a t  28; Viles, supra a t  644-49. 
47. For authority indicating validity under Bankruptcy Act § 64, see 2 G. GILMORE, 
supra note 6, a t  1337-40, 1342-44; Hawkland, supm note 6, a t  18; Henson, supra note 6, 
a t  244-46,251-52. See also In re Harpeth Motors, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 863 (M.D. Tenn. 1955). 
For authority indicating no statutory lien under § 67c of the Act, see Epstein, supra 
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sufficient to observe that even had the Ninth Circuit construed 
U.C .C. section 9-306(4) (d) as not creating a voidable preference 
under section 60, the court may have found adequate foundation 
to reach the same ultimate result as it did in the instant case, 
either by holding the Code section explicitly invalid under the 
Bankruptcy Act or by rendering it grossly emasculated. 
2. The interplay within section 9-306(4) 
After setting forth its position that a creditor could not suc- 
cessfully assert its claim under U.C.C. section 9-306(4)(d) to 
thwart the trustee's power to set that interest aside as a prefer- 
ence, the court hastened to add that it did not necessarily follow 
that a creditor would also lose that portion of the secured interest 
representing its own proceeds. Rather, to the extent the creditor 
is able to identify its own proceeds by tracing, it will be able to 
defeat pro tanto the trustee's assertion of a preference. In so rul- 
ing, but without specifically commenting thereon, the court 
struck down the result of a literal reading of the subsections 
within section 9-306(4). 
Although upon the institution of insolvency proceedings 
subsection (d) affords a secured creditor a potentially larger per- 
fected interest than theretofore enjoyed (i.e. in proceeds not de- 
rived from the creditor's collateral), subsections (b) and (c) cut 
in the opposite direction. Under a literal reading, the creditor, for 
whatever benefit may be derived from subsection (d), gives up, 
under subsections (b) and (c), its claim, previously recognized 
under sections 9-306(2) and (3), to all identifiable cash proceeds 
commingled prior to the insolvency proceedings. Thus, it could 
logically be argued in the instant case that even though the bene- 
fit derived under subsection (d) is effectively canceled by the 
operation of section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, such an event has 
no bearing on the revival of the right to identifiable but commin- 
gled proceeds forfeited under subsections (b) and (c) .48 Therefore, 
the secured creditor's only hope for revival of its secured interest 
in identifiable proceeds under sections 9-306(2) and (3) would 
appear to rest on the court's determination that subsections (b), 
note 6, at 799-801; Hawkland, supra note 6, at 18; Henson, supra note 6, at 247. 
For authority suggesting no vulnerability to § 70c of the Act, see 2 G. GILMORE, supra 
note 6, at 1336; Hawkland, supra note 6, at 18; Henson, supra note 6, at 247. See also In 
re United Thrift Stores, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1965). 
For authority indicating validity under li 70e of the Act, see 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 
6, at 1336; Hawkland, supra note 6, at 18; Henson, supm note 6, at 247. 
48. See note 3 supm for complete text. 
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(c), and (d) are not severable; that is, if subsection (d) effectively 
falls, so must subsections (b) and (c)." Although the history be- 
hind section 9-306(4) tends to indicate an intent to consider the 
section as a whole, the court is still confronted with the awkward 
problem of explaining away the rule dictated by U.C.C. section 
1-108,50 requiring severability unless effect cannot be given to the 
remaining provisions without reference to those invalidated. As- 
suming the Ninth Circuit recognized this interplay, as did the 
Seventh Circuit in Fit~patrick,~' it should have explicitly dealt 
with the issue and thereby laid clear precedent for future cases.52 
C. Potential Relief Still Available Under Gibson 
The ultimate result in Gibson turned on whether there had 
been "a transfer [within the meaning of section 60a(2) of the 
Bankruptcy Act] . . . within four months before the filing . . . 
[of bankr~ptcy] ."~~ However, the catalytic event under U.C.C. 
section 9-306(4) for securing a perfected interest in "excess" pro- 
ceeds is the institution of "insolvency  proceeding^."^^ " ' Insol- 
vency proceedings,' " defined at  U.C .C. section 1-201 (22), "in- 
cludes any assignment for the benefit of creditors or other pro- 
ceedings intended to liquidate or rehabilitate the estate of the 
person involved." Very conceivably such an event could take 
place (inadvertently or after careful planning) more than four 
months prior to the actual filing of a petition in bankruptcy. In 
such circumstances, and by implication from the instant case, the 
secured creditor would obtain a perfected security interest in all 
49. Cf .  Countryman, supra note 6, a t  274-75 (advancing this same rationale when 
discussing the vulnerability of U.C.C. § 9-306(4) (d) to Bankruptcy Act 9 § 64,67c and 7Oc). 
50. U.C.C. 8 1-108 provides: 
If any provision or clause of this Act or application thereof to any person or 
circumstances is held invalid [or ineffectual], such invalidity shall not affect 
other provisions or applications of the Act which can be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of the Act are 
declared to be severable. 
51. The court stated, in footnote, "In view of the extensive speculation about the 
potential conflict between section 9-306(4)(d) and the Bankruptcy Act, it is somewhat 
surprising that the trustee did not challenge Philco's right to the . . . [identifiable pro- 
ceeds] paid from commingled funds." 491 F.2d a t  1292 n.4. 
52. In Gibson, the amount in question was admittedly small ($10); however, in most 
cases such would obviously not be the circumstance. For example, in Fitzpatrick, although 
the issue was not pleaded and, therefore, not ruled upon, in question would have been 
$4513.44, which represented more than 10 percent of the subject bank account. 491 F.2d 
at 1292. The loss of such an amount to many secured creditors would represent all that 
had been gained from the profit margin on thousands of dollars of other sales. 
53. Bankruptcy Act 60a(l), 11 U.S.C. 8 96(a)(l) (1970). 
54. For complete text of U.C.C. 9 9-306(4), see note 3 supra. 
9381 CASE NOTES 951 
the debtor's commingled funds, valid even against a trustee in 
bankruptcy. Even if such a strategy were employed a t  some fu- 
ture time, however, the perfected interest would possibly remain 
susceptible to defeat when confronted by the other statutory 
weapons within the arsenal of the Bankruptcy Act? 
D. The Countermove-An Amendment to the U. C .  C .  ? 
Over the past several years, specific amendments to U.C.C. 
section 9-306(4) have been proposed56 to deal with the then poten- 
tial conflict a t  issue in the instant case. Characteristic of each 
proposed amendment, however, has been either the retention of 
language that would inevitably lead to a U.C .C .-Bankruptcy Act 
court confrontation5' or the elimination of the controversial inter- 
est granted under section 9-306(4)(d) and a retreat to the pre- 
Code rules of tracing.58 
In light of the instant holding and the extensive authority the 
Bankruptcy Act itself commands under the supremacy of federal 
law,59 any further amendment to the U.C.C. with the view of 
somehow sustaining, even in bankruptcy, the secured interest 
contemplated by U.T.R.A. section 10(b) and U.C.C. section 9- 
3O6(4) (d), would be futile. Any effective future amendment must 
necessarily be to the Bankruptcy Act itself?O 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Except for the previously mentioned potential relief for cred- 
itors, the three-fold message emanating from Gibson is clear. 
First, a creditor's right under section 9-306(4)(d) to a perfected 
security interest in commingled proceeds other than its own is 
almost entirely ineffective in bankru~tcy.~ '  Second, for a secured 
creditor to avoid both the limitations of U.C.C. section 9- 
55. See text accompanying note 46 supra. 
56. See, e.g., Gillombardo, supra note 6, a t  30-31; Hawkland, supra note 6, at 18-19. 
57. Hawkland, supm note 6, a t  18-19. 
58. Gillombardo, supra note 6, a t  30-31; note 35 supra. 
59. 4A COLLIER ON B A N K R U ~ C Y  fi 70.06, a t  81 (14th ed. J. Moore & J. King 1976). See 
also Schwartz, supra note 6, at 60, 82-83. 
60. See generally Schwartz, supra note 6, a t  60; Commercial Reasonableness. supra 
note 6, a t  939-41, 957. 
61. See text accompanying notes 36 and 37 supra. It is, of course, possible that more 
than one creditor asserting a perfected security interest in "excess" proceeds under U.C.C. 
$ 9-306(4)(d) can survive the test imposed by Bankruptcy Act § 60b. In such an event 
the "excess" proceeds would presumably be distributed pro rata based on the amount of 
the creditors' residual claims after any identifiable collateral inventory or proceeds there- 
from had been recovered. 
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306(4)(d) and the burden of proving the identity of its own pro- 
ceeds in light of an almost inevitable contest with the debtor's 
trustee in bankruptcy, i t  must prevent commingling of its pro- 
ceeds, and thus follow U.C .C. section 9-306(4) (a) -(c) ." Finally, 
since pragmatically many secured creditors will be unable to en- 
force on a day-to-day basis the segregation of their own proceeds 
through financing agreements, their only recourse in the face of 
the debtor's potential bankruptcy is to police the flow of proceeds 
to such a degree that they will be most able to specifically trace 
and identify their own cash proceeds, even after commingling. 
62. See note 3 supra. 
